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IMMUNITY FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER THE FEDERAL
COMPULSORY TESTIMONY ACT*
The privilege against self-incrimination has
been regarded, since early in English history,
as an essential safeguard against unfounded
and tyrannical prosecution.' During its development in England and America, there was
much experimentation with.granting immunity
instead of permitting an unbridled exercise of

a claim asserting the privilege. 2 In 1857 Con3
gress passed the first federal immunity act.
However, the 1857 Act was phrased so loosely
that the witness could voluntarily disclose
unresponsive self-incriminating testimony and
thus gain an "immunity bath," that is, immunity from prosecution for all offenses dis-

*"§ 3486. Compelled testimony tending to incriminate witnesses; immunity
(a) In the course of any investigation relating to
any interference with or endangering of, or any
plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger the
national security or defense of the United States by
treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy or the overthrow of its Government by force
or violence, no witness shall be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or other
evidence before either House, or before any committee of either House, or before any joint committee
of the two Houses of Congress on the ground that
the testimony or evidence required of him may tend
to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture, when the record shows that(1) in the case of proceedings before one of
the Houses of Congress, that a majority of the
members present of that House; or
(2) in the case of proceedings before a committee, that two-thirds of the members of the
full committee shall by affirmative vote have
authorized such witness to be granted immunity
under this section with respect to the transactions, matters, or things concerning which he is
compelled, after having claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination to testify or produce
evidence by direction of the presiding officer;
and
that an order of the United States district

court for the district wherein the inquiry is
being carried on has been entered into the
record requiring said person to testify or produce evidence. Such an order may be issued by
a United States district court judge upon application by a duly authorized representative of
the Congress or of the committee concerned.
But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on
account of any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning-which he is so compelled, after
having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence,
nor shall testimony so compelled be used as
evidence in any criminal proceeding (except
prosecutions described in subsection (d) hereof)
against him in any court.
(b) Neither House nor any committee thereof nor
any joint committee of the two Houses of Congress
shall grant immunity to any witness without first
having notified the Attorney General of the United
Statps of such action and thereafter having secured
the approval of the United States district court for
the district wherein such inquiry is being held. The
Attorney General of the United States shall be
notified of the time of each proposed application to
the United States district court and shall be given
the opportunity to be heard with respect thereto
prior to the entrance into the record of the order of
the district court.
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closed in this testimony.4 Congress then rewrote
this statute in 1868 and provided that the
compelled testimony itself could not later be
used in any criminal proceeding against the
witness, but that immunity would not be
granted for evidence acquired by testimony
not responsive to the question asked.6 In
(c) Whenever in the judgment of a United States
attorney the testimony of any witness, or the production of books, papers, or other evidence by any
witness, in any case or proceeding before any grand
jury or court of the United States invol.ving any
interference with or endangering of, or any plans or
attempts to interfere with or endanger, the national
security or defense of the United States by treason,
sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy,
violations of chapter 115 of title 18 of the United
States Code, violations of the Internal Security Act
of 1950 (64 Stat. 987), violations of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 755), as amended,
violations of sections 212(a) (27), (28), (29) or
241(a) (6), (7) or 313(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (66 Stat. 182-186; 204-206; 240241), and conspiracies involving any of the foregoing, is necessary to the public interest, he, upon
the approval of the Attorney General, shall make
application to the court that the witness shall be
instructed to testify or produce evidence subject to
the provisions of this section, and upon order of the
court such witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or other
evidence on the ground that the testimony or
evidence required of him may tend to incriminate
him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But
no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he
is compelled, after having claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used
as evidence in any criminal proceeding (except
prosecution desribed in subsection (d) hereof)
against him in any court.
(d) No witness shall be exempt under the provision of this section from prosecution for perjury or
contempt committed while giving testimony or
producing evidence under compulsion as provided in
this section. As amended Aug. 20, 1954, c. 769, S 1,
68 Stat. 745." 18 U. S. C. § 3486 (Supp. 1954).
1The English Parliament never thought it necessary to pass an act providing for the privilege
against self-incrimination since it was so well established. The privilege concept was carried to America
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Counselman v. Hiccock,6 section 860, which
was the court and grand jury section of this
revised Act, was held invalid because the immunity provided by it was not coextensive
with the privilege against self-incrimination
which the witness was required to surrender 7
The defects of the 1868 Act were avoided in
by early settlers and placed in the group of ten
amendments recommended to the states by the first
Congress. See Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional Historyof the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incriminalion in America, 21 VA. L. Rxv. 763, 770-773 (1935);
Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Micn. L. REv. 1, 12
(1930); INBAU, SELf-INCanMATION (1950).
28 WiGmoRE, EvDEucE § 2281 (3d ed. 1940). Im-

munity was granted to secure information otherwise
unobtainable since all who could give useful testimony were incriminated in the offense.
3 11 STAT. 155 (1857)
4During congressional investigations a clerk who
had stolen two million dollars in bonds from the
Interior Department was discharged and the indictment against him was quashed, and several indictments against a former Secretary of War were
dismissed, since both men had gained unintended
immunity for statements not responsive to the
questions asked. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d
Sess. 387 (1862).
6 Rnv.

STAT.

J§

859, 860 (1875).

6 142 U. S.546 (1892).
7
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to be a witness against himself."
U. S. CONsT. amend. V. The constitutional privilege

is applicable only to Congress and the federal
courts and not to the several states. Brown v.
Walker, 161 U. S. 591,606 (1896). The test enundated in the Counselman case is that the immunity
granted must be coextensive with the privilege it
replaces so that there is a full and complete substitution for the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination which the witness is required to
surrender. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547,
585-86 (1892). The court construed the statute
involved to prohibit direct use of the testimony
compelled but not to prohibit the derivative use of
evidence so obtained. Section 860 was not repealed
until 1910. 36 STAT. 352 (1910). Congress must have
felt that § 859, applying the grant of immunity to
congesssional committees, was still of some value
since it left this section in force until repealed by the
present Federal Compulsory Testimony Act. 62
STAT. 833, 11 U.S.C. §3486 (Supp. 1954), amending
Rav. STAT. § 859 (1875).
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an immunity provision incorporated into the
Interstate Commerce Commission legislation
in 1893. This provision granted absolute immunity from prosecution in the federal courts.
Subsequently, immunity clauses were incorporated in many temporary wartime measures
and in virtually"all of the major regulatory
enactments of the federal government.1 Furthermore, a majority of the states have enacted
immunity legislation.' 0
Although the Counselman decision had held
the grand jury and court section of the 1868
Act invalid, there remained in force its companion provision, which permitted congressional committees to extend a grant of immunity to witnesses appearing before them."
However, Congress became increasingly disturbed as suspected subversives and criminals
refused to testify before congressional com-

mittees.u In addition, witnesses appearing
before federal grand juries and courts in proceedings involving the national defense and
security were free to invoke the privilege since
Congress had failed to replace the grand jury
and court immunity provision invalidated in
the Counseltnan case. Accordingly, in 1954,
Congress passed the Federal Compulsory
Testimony Act, 3 the purpose of which was to
secure evidence of federal crimes affecting
national defense and security by means of an
effective grant of immunity. 4 This Act provides that a witness shall neither be prosecuted
nor subjected to penalty concerning activities
about which he has been compelled to testify,
and his testimony may not be used against
him as evidence in any criminal proceeding.
Sections (a) and (b) of the Act deal with
congressional investigations. Section (a) provides that if a witness claims his privilege s

' This statute, the Act of Feb. 11, 1893, c. 83, 27
STwr. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1953), was held
constitutional in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896) since it provided the equivalent of the constitutional privilege. The procedure followed under the
Interstate Commerce Commission Act involved in
the Brown case was more strict than that followed
under the 1857 Act which allowed immunity baths.
In the proceedings leading up to the Brown case the
witness was required to claim his privilege before a
court order was issued granting him immunity for
matters disclosed in answers to specific questions.
Immunity was then to be granted only for matters
specified in the court order so that if the witness
volunteered incriminating testimony he thereby
waived his privilege for such voluntary information.
The constitutionality of immunity statutes has been
sustained in seven other cases before the Supreme
Court. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905); Heike
v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913); United
States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943); Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); Smith v. United
States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949); Adams v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 179 (1954).
For a collection of these statutes see Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1,n. 4 (1948).
10State statutes, including those which prohibit
prosecution for matters described in the testimony
and those which merely prohibit the use of such
compelled testimony, are collected in 8 WIGoORiE
EVmENcE, § 2281, n. 11 (3d ed. 1940).
u See note 7 supra.

U See H.R. REP'. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1954). Hearings before Subcommittee No. I of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., 133-167 (1954). Many witnesses preferred to
risk the contempt sanction rather than risk conviction for a crime involving a much more serious
penalty. Only one of the hoodlums before the
Kefauver Committee was jailed for contempt but
he could have escaped this by claiming his privilege
instead of defiantly walking out on the committee.
See, Inbau, Should We Abolish the PrivilegeAgainst
Self-Incrimination, 45 J. CRLm. L., C. & P.S., 180,

183 (1954).
"62 STAT. 833, 18 U-S.C. § 3486 (Supp. 1954).
34See note 12 supra.

"sWhat language must a witness employ in claiming the privilege? In Quinn v. United States, 347
U.S. 1008 (1955); Emspack v. United States, 346
U.S. 809 (1955); Bart v. United States, 347 U.S.
1011 (1955), recent Supreme Court decisions, vague
language was sustained. Will this type of vacillation
by witnesses be sufficient under a congressional proceeding [§§ (a) and (b)l in which the statutory
language for the first time specifically requires a
claim? Will a different standard apply before grand
juries and courts when a witness seeks to invoke his
privilege?
In the Emspaock case Justice Harlan decried the
Supreme Court's apparent retreat from Learned
Hand's test of when the privilege can be properly
invoked. According to this test, the witness to have
a proper basis for his claim must face the risk of
exposing himself to a real and appreciable danger as
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while testifying before either Congress or a
congressional committee there may be a grant
of immunity authorized upon a majority vote
of the entire legislative body or by a two-thirds
vote of the committee respectively. Then, a
duly authorized representative of the body
concerned applies to the district court for an
order compelling the desired testimony or
papers. Such order compelling testimony may
be issited by a United States district court
judge. Section (b) provides that the Attorney
General of the United States must first be
notified and given an opportunity to be heard
by the court before approval by the district
court. Section (c), which pertains to grand
jury investigations and court trials, also requires a witness to claim his privilege against
self-incrimination.'
If the United States
Attorney who is handling the case, believes it
necessary to the public interest that a witness
be compelled to testify, he must seek the
approval of the Attorney General. If the latter
approves, application is then made to the
district court to issue an order instructing the
witness to testify or produce the required
evidence. 6
Proceedings under the Compulsory Testimony Act may raise many problems such as
whether the adverse party requirement of a
case or controversy is fulfilled; whether there
is a violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and whether Congress has the power
to prevent any prosecution by the states for
crimes disclosed in federally compelled testimony.
These problems were considered in the
first case to be decided under the 1954 Act,
opposed to a remote and unlikely possibility of selfincrimination. Weisman v. United States, 111 F.2d
260 (2d Cir. 1940). Will, as the majority decision in
the Emtspack case seems to indicate, a different
standard be applied under §§ (a) and (b) proceedings than under (c)?
15 See note 15 supra.
16 Section (d) provides that under this statute the
witness is still subject to prosecution for perjury or
contempt committed while giving compelled testimony.
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It re Ullman.17 The case arose when Ullman
refused to testify before a grand jury, claiming
his Fifth Amendment privilege. The United
States Attorney requested an order granting
him immunity which was issued by the federal
district court; but upon Ullman's continued
refusal to testify he was sentenced to six
months for contempt of court.
In the district court, Ullman alleged a lack
of adverse parties. This problem may arise if
the witness wishes immunity and thus has
interests which coincide with those of the interrogator. 8 However, since a witness must
first claim his privilege of refusing to testify
before immunity can be granted, it seems
apparent that the court which issues the order
compelling testimony is confronted with at
least two adverse parties, the witness and the
Attorney General. 9 In construing the grand
17128 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y.), a.f'd 221 F.2d 760
(2d Cir. 1955), cert. granted 349 U.S. 951 (1955). The
court held, inter alia, that the immunity provided
by the statute is coextensive with the privilege
against self-incrimination and is, therefore an adequate substitute for it. In answer to Ullman's objection that the request of such information violated
his First Amendment rights, the court held that the
investigation did not relate to his political belief and
affiliation. In addition, the court also held that the
questions appeared to come within the framework of
an inquiry into national defense or security, hence
the witness had no basis for urging that the questions
were incompetent and immaterial. As to the latter
proposition, see Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273,282 (1918); Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S.
91, 115 (1905); United States v. McGovern, 60 F.2d
880,888-889 (2d Cir. 1932).
19Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)
held that a court created under Article IlI of the
Constitution may only adjudicate a case or controversy involving present or possible adverse parties
whose opposing contentions are submitted. The
United States is "always a possible adverse party."
Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568,577 (1926).
19Even though the witness may want immunity
from prosecution for a crime about which he may be
"compelled" to testify, it is evident in a claim of the
privilege that the witness would prefer to remain
silent instead of being granted immunity in exchange
for his testimony. The opposing argument is that the
witness, although desirous of immunity, is forced to
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jury section [§c] of the Act, the court in the
Ullman case held that the witness could raise
all legal or constitutional objections against
immunity-thus providing the necessary adverse parties. 1
Discounting the witness as a possible adverse party under a section (a) and (b) proceeding there is still the possibility of finding
two adverse parties. These sections are designed
to allow Congress and the courts to weigh the
effect of information relating to prospective
witnesses which is ordinarily available only
to the Attorney General.n The Attorney
General would serve as a check on Congress
which might, in ignorance of other investigations and pending prosecutions, unwisely wish
to grant immunity.2 It is also possible that
during investigations of the executive department Congress may point up activities, a disclosure of which the Attorney General might
improperly wish to suppress.u Thus, in the
go through the formality of claiming his privilege,
thereby precluding classifying him as an adverse
party.
"This of course is a different means of arriving at
an adverse party situation, and by this the technical
problems considered in note "19supra are avoided.
n As chief legal officerof the United States Government the Attorney General would know of pending
prosecutions that might be disrupted by a judicially
sanctioned Congressional grant of immunity.
n See remarks of Senator Kefauver, S. REP. No.
153, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), Brownell, Immunity from Prosecution Versus Privsege A gainst SdfIncrimination,28 Tm.. L. R v. 1 (1953). It should
be noted that certain legislators wanted to go so far
as to give the Attorney General the power to veto
congressional grants of immunity. See Minority
Views, H. R. REP. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1954); 99 CONG. Rxc. 8342 (1953); 99 CoNG. Rxc.
8346 (1953).
62Some legislators felt that the granting of immunit should be left exclusively to the legislature
since the Attorney General could frustrate legislative investigations of the executive branch. 99 CONG.
Rxc. 8342 (1953). For examples of disputes between
two branches of the government see United States
v. ICC., 337 US. 426 (1949); In the Matter of the
NLRB, 304 U.S. 486 (1938); But cf. Defense Supplies Corp. v. United States Lines Co., 148 F.2d
311 (2d Cir. 1945).

congressional section as well as in the court and
grand -jury section there is the possibility of
finding two adverse parties.
Another problem arising is whether Congress
has conferred upon the courts a non-judicial
power, thereby violating the doctrine of separation of powers. According to a statement in
the Ullman case, the court may be required to
exercise a non-judicial discretion under sections
(a) and (b) of the Act, distinguishing it from
the judicial function performed under section
(c).m In that case the court deemed significant
the language in sections (a) and (b) which
requires the Congress to notify the Attorney
General and secure the approval of the district
court before granting immunity and which
provides that the order may be issuted by the
district court judge.25 According to the court,
the district judge would participate in balancing the possibility and advisability of prosecuting the individual against the need for
particular information to see whether the public
interest may best be served by granting immunity. If the district court does have the
final decision of what is in the public interest
21128 F.Supp. at 625. The district court opinion
set up the following prerequisite conditions to be
checked by the court before ordering the witness to
testify under a section (c) proceeding: (1) the proceeding must relate to national security and defense;
(2) the United States Attorney and the Attorney
General must have approved the application; (3) no
other legal objection exists to the compulsion of the
witness's testimony. A legal objection would be that
the witness had not properly claimed his privilege.
See note 15 supra.
25 128 F. Supp. at 625.
1A
test suggested by the A.B.A. to determine
whether immunity should be granted is as follows:
"Is the evidence expectable from this witness so
important to this proceeding, and is this proceeding
so important, that the witness should now be compelled to give his evidence and so be immunized, in
spite of the offense for which he may go unpunished
and in spite of the damage his immunity may do t6
present or future efforts to enforce the criminal laws
of this state or to the public interest in a just,
orderly society?" A.B.A. CommissioN oN ORGANFm.
CRnmE, OGANIqZED CRInM Aim LAW ENFORCEMENT,
VO. II, Appeidix 4, p. 157 (1953).
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under sections (a) and (b) then there is the
possibility of an improper merger of judicial,
executive, and legislative functions."
However, the process of balancing the need
for testimony against the desirability of
prosecution seems not altogether different from
the judicial balancing of competing considerations in other areas of judicial activity.
Throughout many of the states it is found that
analogous duties are performed by judges.'s
For instance the courts may consider applications for the recount of votes following an
election.2 ' In addition, Congress delegates the
power to federal courts to exercise their discretion in imposing prison terms within specified limits,23 and to suspend sentences and
place convicted persons on probation.3' In
probation matters the judicial discretion is
necessarily broad since the punishment must
be tailored to the individual defendant. Likewise, in the present situation the order must be
tailored to the individual witness being interrogated. In both, the public interest and
the interest of the individual are under consideration by the judge.? The preceding
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examples illustrate that in many situations
there may be a very broad interpretation as
to what constitutes a proper judicial function.
In this instance the delegation of a certain
amount of discretion recognizes that additional
security may be afforded a witness by vesting
the final determination, as to whether or not
immunity should be granted, in the hands of
the judiciary. Furthermore, the public interest
would best be served by allowing the three
branches of government to serve as checks on
one another -inthis area. However, if it is
determined that non-judicial discretion does
lie with the court under sections (a) and (b),
then the Supreme Court may declare these
sections unconstitutional while permitting the
court and grand jury section [§c] to stand.Seemingly the most important problem of
practical significance raised by the Act is
whether Congress. has the power to prevent
subsequent state prosecutions for crimes disdosed in federally compelled testimonyU An
understanding of some basic principles is necessary to properly focus this issue. In United

to do so by the emergency strike provisions of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1952); United States v.
United Steel Workers, CIO, 202 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1952), ced. denied, 344 U.S. 915 (1953). For an
example of a court exercising a broad discretion in
JUDICARY (1905).
29 These include the appointment of city park
bankruptcy matters, see In re New York, N.H. &
commissioners, water commissioner, morgue keep- H.R., 16 F. Supp. 504 (D.Conn. 1936); In re Burgh,
ers, commissioners to survey the boundary between 7 F. Supp. 184 (N.D.Ill. 1933); and in divorce promunicipalities, and persons to examine sick, maimed, ceedings, see Allen v. Allen, 73 Conn. 54,46 AUt. 242
or disabled animals. VANDERBILT, THE DocTrrNE (1900).
OF TIE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT
31Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158
DAY SIGNIFICANCE, 114 (1953).
U.S. 601 (1895); Ballester-Ripoll v. Court of Tax
" Massett Building Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, Appeals of Puerto Rico, 142 F.2d 11, 19 (Ist. Cir.
59-60, 71 A.2d 327, 330-331 (1950).
1944).
-045 STAT. 1146 (1929), 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1952);
34 There was some doubt evidenced in debate as
Ross v. United States, 37 F.2d 557 (4th Cir. 1930), to whether the language of the statute did prevent
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 767 (1930); McElvogue v. state prosecution. See comments by Representatives
United States, 40 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1930), ccrI. Celler and Dodd. 100 CONG. REc. 12603-7 (1954).
denied, 282 U.S. 845 (1930).
This seems to have been resolved by the Report of
" Traditionally policy decisions rest either with
the executive or legislative branches of government
since they, unlike the judiciary, are directly responsible to the electorate. See BA.DWIN, Tax AmERicAN

1259 (1925), 18 U.S.C.

the House Committee of the Judiciary which stated

§ 3651 (1952). Riggs v. United States, 14 F.2d 5
(4th Cir. 1926); Nix v. James, 7 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.
1925).
n Courts also balance competing considerations in
other areas. Courts will decide if a strike would
imperil the national health or safety when required

that it intended to ban subsequent state prosecutions even though it doubted the congressional

= Probation Act, 43

STAT.

power to do so. H.R. REP.No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d

Sess., 3059, 3064 (1954). The court, in the Ullman
case, concluded that this was the congressional
intention.
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States v. Murdock,' 5 the Supreme Court held
that the privilege against self-incrimination
could not be invoked before a federal tribunal
where incrimination under state law was
feared' According to this rule there can be no
valid objection to a federal immunity statute
if a witness is not protected from possible state
prosecution, since the immunity need only be
as broad as the privilege it replaces. A federal
grant of immunity, where state law violations
are involved, would seem to be a matter of

legislative discretion and not a benefit to
which the witness is entitled as a matter of

right. Such an exercise of discretion was read
into the former act and held valid by the
Supreme Court in Adams v.MarylandY The
immunity statute then in use' s purported to
extend the scope of immunity beyond that of
the Fifth Amendment Privilege by proscribing
the use of testimony, given by a federal witness

in congressional inquiries, before state as
well as federal courts. However, the Adams
decision did not preclude prosecution by state
authorities, since the immunity was held to

extend only to the actual testimony given and
-284 U.S. 141 (1931). Also see Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 546 (1892); Brown v. Walker
161 U.S. 591, 606 (1896); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S.
372, 381 (1905); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 68
(1906).
" But cf. United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp.
697, (N.D.Ohio 1952) which held that a witness
before a government committee conducting an
investigation of organized crime is entitled to remain
silent if he would incriminate himself under state
laws. This was distinguished from the Murdock case
since state crime investigations were involved and
there was the imminent possibility of state prosecution as compared to a remote possibility in the
Murdock case.
"347 U.S. 179 (1949) Adams, testifying under a
grant of immunity before a congressional committee
investigating crime, confessed to having run a
gambling business in Maryland. In the Criminal
Court of Baltimore, he was convicted, through the
use of this testimony, of conspiring to violate the
state's anti-lottery laws. His conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court. See Notes, 29 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 1483 (1954); 52 MicH. L. Pxv. 1240
(1954).
"62 STAT. 833, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1948).

not to derivatively obtained evidenceJ? The
rationale underlying the Adams decision is that
a statute barring use of testimony elicited by
the federal government is a legitimate exercise
of the congressional power "necessary and
proper" to carry out its legislative function and
is binding upon the states as "the supreme law
of the land."40 Supported by the above proposition, the apparent purpose of Congress in
passing this statute is to advance beyond the
Adams decision and ban subsequent state
prosecution." Since Congress has the power to
prohibit the use in state courts of evidence
elicited before congressional committees, there
appears to be no valid reason why it should
not have the power to bar any subsequent
prosecution concerning matters disclosed in
testimony elicited before a federal grand jury

or other federal body."
In matters of national concern, such as
national defense and security, to which the
present Act relates, Congress may pass laws
superseding state legislation on the same subject. An example of this is the supersedure
n347 U.S. at 181.
0 Congress may pass laws "necessary and proper"
to carry out legislative functions vested in it by
Article I. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18. The power
to investigate is a necessary concomitant of its
legislative function. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135 (1927). When Congress in the legitimate
exercise of its powers enacts 'the supreme law of the
land," state courts are bound by such law even
though it affects their rules of practice. U. S. CoNsT.
art. VI, cl. 2, as construed in Adams v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 179 (1949)
41 See note 34 supra.
42 See note 40 supra.
41 In many areas, where there is an overlapping of
federal and state legislation, the trend has been to
recognize a "federal supremacy." A federal court
on habeas corpus proceedings, may release a party
who is in the custody of a state officer, In re Neagle,
135 U.S. 1 (1890); buta state court may not interfere
with the work of federal officers or judicial tribunals.
Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (U.S. 1867);
In re Tarble, 13 Wall. 397 (U.S. 1872). See United
States v. Candelaria, 131 F.Supp. 797 (S.D. Cal.
1955) for attempted but unsuccessful interference
by state executive authorities with federal judicial
functions in a situation involving parole of a federal
4
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of a state law requiring alien registration" by
a federal law on the same subject 4" intended to
meet seditious and like activities. In Hines v.
Daidowitz the Supreme Court held that
Congress has the power to pre-empt the field of
alien registration. In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Nelson47 it was held that in view

of the pre-eminence of the national government's interest in defending itself against
sedition, its control of the field must be exclusive. There is no doubt that Congress has the
power to provide for a grant of immunity in
the interests of national defense and security;
there is little doubt that Congress has the
power to grant immunity that will bar state
prosecutions.
Though there may be some question as to
the constitutionality and desirability of the
role vested in the district court under the
Federal Compulsory Testimony Act, it does
contain notable improvements over previous
immunity legislation." The possibility of "imprisoner. If property subject to tax by both governments is insufficient to pay both claims, Congress
may provide that it must be sold for federal taxes
first, and only the remainder will be paid to the
state. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S.
80 (1929). See Field, Slates Versus the Nation and
the Supreme Court, 28 AmsER. POL. Sci. Rzv. 233

(1934).
" PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 35, §§ 1801-1806 (Purdon,
Supp. 1954)
45Act of June 28, 1940, c. 439, 54 STAT. 670.

46312 U.S. 52 (1940).
47377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954), cert. granted

sub. nom. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 348 U.S. 814
(1955). It is not necessary to find an affirmatively
expressed legislative intent for Congress to pre-empt
a particular field. Such purpose can as readily be
evidenced objectively by what the circumstances
reasonably indicate as being necessary to effectuate
the federal objectives. The power to pre-empt certain
state legislation is given by the state to the national
government in the Constitution and also springs
from the federal government's power of selfpreservation. Supra 104 A.2d at 137, 138.
-221 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1955). The United States
Court of Appeals indicated that the statute may
not, in today's circumstances, give true immunity
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munity baths" is minimized since the Act is
confined to comparatively narrow limits of
investigation, a specific claim of privilege by
the witness is required, the order of the district
attorney and Attorney General are required,
and the witness cannot testify outside the
limits of the immunity granted. This immunity
Act furnishes a valuable tool which enables the
government to secure evidence otherwise unobtainable even though the details of procedure
to be followed in granting immunity in many
places must be inferred from the avowed
purpose of Congress. The delegation to the
courts by the legislature of certain procedural
duties or even the delegation of a certain
amount of discretion reflects an instinctive
desire to seek an impartial and independent
tribunal as an additional safeguard for the
handling of this vital problem. Even though the
exact extent of the immunity conferred by the
Act is not stated therein, the legislative history
against "legal detriment" within the meaning of
the Constitution. The last word on the subject by
the Supreme Court was in Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1896). The legal detriment feared is that
confession of serious crimes exposes the witness to
such infamy and disgrace that his ability to earn a
living is affected. See Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367 (1951) in which the witness was unwil!iiag
to cause others to be questioned and accordingly
claimed his privilege wrongfully. Furthermore there
may be federal disabilities arising from compelled
testimony, e.g., the Internal Security Act, which
prohibits employment of members of certain organizations from filling government or defense jobs. 64
STAT. 987 (1950), 18 U.S.C. § 741 passim (Supp. V.
1952). Also federal executive orders on current
loyalty procedures prohibit the employment of
so-called radicals in government jobs. Dean Griswold viewed the Federal Compulsory Testimony
Act with misgivings, even though he believes the
literal requirements of the Constitution are met.
THE F=rie A
a .xirT TODAY, 80
(1955). See also Comment, Federal Anti-Subversive
Legislation, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 631, 654-658 (1955).
GRiswoLD,

For a severe criticism of the Act see Dixon, The
Doctrine of Separation of Powers and the Federal
Immunity Statute, 23 GEO. WAsn. L. REv. 627

(1955).

